A book which might well become a classic on Heidegger. Richardson discusses most of Heidegger's works in chronological order, offering a close analysis of each. Most chapters include a general exposition of the argument of the work discussed, a detailed analysis of the problems of Thought, Being and Dasein in the work, and a résumé. While maintaining very high standards of scholarly precision in the rendering of Heidegger's ideas and terminology, Richardson yet succeeds in making his book very readable and (...) lucid. Without "supplementing" Heidegger in any way, refraining from explanatory speculations and staying always very close to the text, he manages to clarify some of the most difficult passages of Heidegger's works. His frequent cross-references make the commentary of genuine value to the advanced student as well as to the novice. Heidegger, in his own preface to the book, criticizes Richardson for the sharp distinction between Heidegger I and Heidegger II, but gives a most important substantiation to two of the author's main theories, viz., the difference between Heidegger's Seinsdenken and Husserl's phenomenology, and the central status of the concept of Ereignis in Heidegger's philosophy. Richardson regrettably does not pursue the Heidegger III suggested by Vycinas, the Heidegger of the Geviert, the question of the nature of Being as such. In some chapters at least this omission makes the interpretation seem partial and sometimes inexact. One hopes for a sequel as good and illuminating.—E. M. Z. (shrink)

A brief, non-technical, well-organized presentation of a system of aesthetics which makes use of insights typical of various Gestalt psychologists and phenomenologists but claims Wittgenstein and the school of language analysis as its only source of influence. Works of art as well as the materials the artist uses are subject to "aspection" and "animation" by various images, such that "each material is featured as a little, elementary aesthetic object." Aldrich offers a theory of evaluations and normative descriptions of works of (...) art, showing that they are not purely subjective or arbitrary. Several important issues remain quite vague throughout the book, e.g., the concept of "holophrastic perception" which is supposed to give us the nature of the "material thing" as it really is. There is a complete lack of interest in anything done in aesthetics by continental philosophers.--E. M. Z. (shrink)

Unlike most anthologies in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, the present selection does not try to collect representative extracts from the writings of most, or even many, important aestheticians throughout the ages. It aims for depth rather than width and tries to do as much justice as possible to those aestheticians which it does include, without bothering much about those left out. The result is really impressive. No less than 138 pages are devoted to Plato and Aristotle alone, where (...) the reader may find not only the usual passages from the Poetics and the Rhetoric but also relevant material from De Partibus Animalium and Politica. Such an anthology, so it seems, must be an opinionated one. Thus, while it contains some 70 pages of Dewey's Art as Experience, there is not a single line of Santayana in it. Although I disagree with the choice made in this case, I cannot but admire the courage it took to make it. Another surprise is the inclusion of the relatively obscure mediaeval thinker, Marsilio Ficino, in an anthology which excludes Baumgarten, Lessing, Burke, Schiller, Coleridge, Bosanquet and Alexander, to mention but few, and whose sole contemporary representative is Heidegger. The extracts from Ficino's commentary on Plato prove, however, to be highly interesting and relatively original, too. Thus, even if Ficino is not as great as some of the aestheticians not included in this volume, I, for one, would not regret this mark of personal, off-beat, taste. The last selection, Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art," appearing for the first time in English translation, comes as special bonus to the reader. The editors' introductions to each selection are generally concise, precise, and very helpful. Sometimes, however, one may find an exception: in their introduction to the Heidegger translation, the editors characterize the Kehre as a "reversal... from the stress on anxiety, nothingness... to a stress on more affirmative moods." This is, to say the least, a grossly misleading remark, which is likely to confuse the student of the later Heidegger rather than help him.—E. M. Z. (shrink)

The book can be roughly divided in two parts. The first four chapters criticize several previous systems of aesthetics, notably those of Cassirer, Croce, and their followers, and suggest an alternative based upon an interesting extension of the recently, much-discussed theory of direct perception as a "seeing-as." Hofstadter would use this model of interpretative-perception to explicate the nature of language as well. A cry will not be, thus, an "expression" of pain but rather present the pain directly; it would articulate (...) human existence in a certain way. Accepting, in addition, the idealistic theory of Categories, Language is understood by Hofstadter as the emergence of the self and the world into a meaningful and an intelligible existence. The next three chapters which, to my mind, make the weaker part of the book, distinguish three kinds of language and, hence, three kinds of truth. There is the truth of statement, which is explicated as the identity of the meant with the existent, the truth of things, which is the practical governance of things by the self's laws and ends, and the truth of spirit, being the synthesis of the former two, where the thing reaches a full realization of its own will of being. When the life-will brings itself to full realization, the thing is perfect, i.e., it is beautiful. It is unfortunate that in the development of these important and highly interesting ideas rhetoric often takes the place of philosophical rigor. The concluding chapter, exploring "the spiritual truth of art," gives a coherent application of the theory and combines a dialogue with several aestheticians, critics, and artists with an analysis of some crucial problems in aesthetics.—E. M. Z. (shrink)

The first six chapters of this book present and criticize six views of the nature of proper names, among which are theories that proper names have no meaning or connotation, that proper names have more meaning than other signs or that their meaning is infinite, that ordinary proper names should be analysed into "logically" proper names, etc. This part of the book is the best. One may find in these chapters several well-reasoned arguments which seem to totally demolish the theories (...) under investigation. Chapters seven to nine present the author's own solution to the problem. Sørensen holds that a proper name does have a meaning—otherwise it would not have been a part of language at all. The meaning of a linguistic sign, he argues, is a set of conditions to be satisfied by an extra-linguistic entity, such that this entity may be identified as denoted by the said sign. A proper name is an individual name, and its meaning is a series of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of the individual entity which this name is intended to denote. It is Sørensen's view that this series consists of a definite description of final length including space and time indicators. The definiens formula for proper names is thus 'P' = 'the x that... t... p....' The discussion of this proposal is, however, greatly impaired by Sørensen's utter disregard for the rich philosophical literature existing on the subject: no attempt is made to confront his view with the now standard arguments against theories of that type. Even many inner difficulties of the proposed solution are ignored. E.g., one may ask what values do 't' and 'p' take in the definition of 'Zeus'. Or take the following puzzle: are 'The x that taught Aristotle in p at t' and 'The x that studied with Socrates in p at t' both the meaning of 'Plato'? Sørensen's view that "A national register may be looked upon as a dictionary of proper names" suggests a positive answer, but surely R and S cannot be the same meaning. Many similar problems bother the reader of Sørensen's book, but, unfortunately, they are nowhere discussed.—E. M. Z. (shrink)

A collection of commentaries on various theories in aesthetics, similar in method and aim to Kainz's Vorlesungen. Far from placing "the study of aesthetics on a new footing" or grasping "the scope of the subject as a whole," as the dust jacket declares, it is still a useful, well organized and often illuminating manual for the student of aesthetics. Sparshott treats some problems clearly and succinctly, but many other questions, such as the mode of being of the work of art (...) or the possibility of regarding art as a cognitive form, are not even mentioned. It also seems that some familiarity with at least the main currents in aesthetics on the continent and a more systematic conception of the field of aesthetics as a whole would have brought Sparshott closer to his stated aims.—E. M. Z. (shrink)